{"id":"CVE-2023-52137","aliases":["GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc"],"summary":"GitHub Action tj-actions/verify-changed-files is vulnerable to command injection in output filenames","published_at":"2023-12-29T17:08:49.356Z","modified_at":"2024-08-02T22:48:12.57Z","products":[{"slug":"github-actions","name":"GitHub Actions","category":"gitops-cicd"}],"rating":{"severity":"high","score":7.7,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L","attack_path":"internet_authenticated","user_interaction":false,"malicious":false},"fix_available":true,"kev":{"listed":false,"ransomware":false},"public_exploit":false,"exploits":[],"epss":{"score":0.02621000073850155,"percentile":0.8579199910163879,"date":"2026-11-19T00:00:00Z"},"priority":8.7,"details":"The [`tj-actions/verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets. The [`verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution. This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a `run` block. By running custom commands, an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as `GITHUB_TOKEN` if triggered on other events than `pull_request`.\n\nThis has been patched in versions [17](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/releases/tag/v17) and [17.0.0](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/releases/tag/v17.0.0) by enabling `safe_output` by default and returning filename paths escaping special characters for bash environments.","affected_stack":[{"ecosystem":"GitHub Actions","package":"tj-actions/verify-changed-files","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"17"}]}],"fixed":["17"],"provider":"osv","source":"GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc","relation":"self"}],"affected_other":[{"ecosystem":"CVE","package":"tj-actions/verify-changed-files","versions":["< 17.0.0"],"provider":"cvelistv5","source":"CVE-2023-52137","relation":"self"},{"ecosystem":"NVD","package":"tj-actions:verify-changed-files","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"17.0.0"}]}],"fixed":["17.0.0"],"provider":"nvd","source":"CVE-2023-52137","relation":"self"}],"product_status":[],"records":[{"provider":"cvelistv5","source_id":"CVE-2023-52137","relation":"self","url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52137","license":"CC-BY-4.0","published_at":"2023-12-29T17:08:49.356Z","modified_at":"2024-08-02T22:48:12.57Z","summary":"GitHub Action tj-actions/verify-changed-files is vulnerable to command injection in output filenames","details":"The [`tj-actions/verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets. The [`verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution. This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a `run` block. By running custom commands, an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as `GITHUB_TOKEN` if triggered on other events than `pull_request`.\n\nThis has been patched in versions [17](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/releases/tag/v17) and [17.0.0](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/releases/tag/v17.0.0) by enabling `safe_output` by default and returning filename paths escaping special characters for bash environments.","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L","source":"CVE-2023-52137"}],"affected":[{"ecosystem":"CVE","package":"tj-actions/verify-changed-files","versions":["< 17.0.0"],"provider":"cvelistv5","source":"CVE-2023-52137","relation":"self"}],"product_status":[],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/security/advisories/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/commit/498d3f316f501aa72485060e8c96fde7b2014f12"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/commit/592e305da041c09a009afa4a43c97d889bed65c3"}]},{"provider":"nvd","source_id":"CVE-2023-52137","relation":"self","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52137","severity":[],"affected":[{"ecosystem":"NVD","package":"tj-actions:verify-changed-files","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"17.0.0"}]}],"fixed":["17.0.0"],"provider":"nvd","source":"CVE-2023-52137","relation":"self"}],"product_status":[],"references":[]},{"provider":"osv","source_id":"GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc","relation":"self","url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc","license":"CC-BY-4.0","published_at":"2024-01-02T16:42:27Z","modified_at":"2024-01-02T16:42:27Z","summary":"Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-275)","details":"### Summary\nThe [`tj-actions/verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) action allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.\n\n### Details\nThe [`verify-changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files) workflow returns the list of files changed within a workflow execution.\n\nThis could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as `;` and \\` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the [GitHub Runner](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-github-hosted-runners/about-github-hosted-runners) if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a `run` block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal **secrets** such as `GITHUB_TOKEN` if triggered on other events than `pull_request`. For example on `push`.\n\n#### Proof of Concept\n\n1. Submit a pull request to the repository with a new file injecting a command. For example `$(whoami).txt` would be a valid filename.\n2. Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the `List all changed files tracked and untracked files` step.\n\n```yaml\n- name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files\n  run: |\n    echo \"Changed files: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}\"\n```\n\nExample output:\n\n```yaml\n##[group]Run echo \"Changed files: $(whoami).txt\"\n  echo \"Changed files: $(whoami).txt\"\u001b[0m\nshell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}\n##[endgroup]\nChanged files: runner.txt\n```\n\n### Impact\nThis issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.\n\n### Resolution\n- A new `safe_output` input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.\n\n- A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.\n\n```yaml\n- name: List all changed files tracked and untracked files\n  env:\n     CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.verify-changed-files.outputs.changed_files }}\n  run: |\n    echo \"Changed files: $CHANGED_FILES\"\n```\n\n\n### Resources\n\n* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 2: Untrusted input](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-untrusted-input/)\n* [Keeping your GitHub Actions and workflows secure Part 1: Preventing pwn requests](https://securitylab.github.com/research/github-actions-preventing-pwn-requests/)","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L","source":"GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc"}],"affected":[{"ecosystem":"GitHub Actions","package":"tj-actions/verify-changed-files","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"17"}]}],"fixed":["17"],"provider":"osv","source":"GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc","relation":"self"}],"product_status":[],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/security/advisories/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52137"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/commit/498d3f316f501aa72485060e8c96fde7b2014f12"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/commit/592e305da041c09a009afa4a43c97d889bed65c3"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files"}]}],"references":[{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/security/advisories/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/commit/498d3f316f501aa72485060e8c96fde7b2014f12"},{"type":"WEB","url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files/commit/592e305da041c09a009afa4a43c97d889bed65c3"},{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52137"},{"type":"PACKAGE","url":"https://github.com/tj-actions/verify-changed-files"}],"sources":[{"provider":"cvelistv5","source_id":"CVE-2023-52137","url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2023-52137","license":"CC-BY-4.0","modified_at":"2024-08-02T22:48:12.57Z","relation":"self"},{"provider":"nvd","source_id":"CVE-2023-52137","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52137","relation":"self"},{"provider":"osv","source_id":"GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc","url":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/GHSA-ghm2-rq8q-wrhc","license":"CC-BY-4.0","modified_at":"2024-01-02T16:42:27Z","relation":"self"}]}
