{"id":"GHSA-ccgh-9g52-6vwg","aliases":[],"summary":"ingress-nginx client certificate authentication (auth-tls-secret) verification bypass and Ssl-Client-* header spoofing on shared hosts","published_at":"2026-11-12T10:01:22Z","modified_at":"2026-11-12T10:08:35Z","products":[{"slug":"traefik","name":"Traefik","category":"proxy"}],"rating":{"severity":"high","score":7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N","attack_path":"internet_unauthenticated","user_interaction":false,"malicious":false},"fix_available":true,"kev":{"listed":false,"ransomware":false},"public_exploit":false,"exploits":[],"priority":9,"record_count":1,"vendors":["GitHub"],"details":"## Summary\r\n\r\nThere is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider when several Ingresses share a host configured for client certificate authentication with the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-tls-secret` annotation. Since v3.7.15 the client authentication applies to the whole host and the TLS handshake uses the settings of the first Ingress declaring it, but the `Ssl-Client-*` headers were still built from the annotations of each Ingress: an Ingress with `auth-tls-verify-client: on` sharing a host with an Ingress using `optional_no_ca` forwarded `Ssl-Client-Verify: SUCCESS`, together with the subject and issuer chosen by the client, for a certificate that was never verified, and an Ingress without its own `auth-tls-secret` or without `auth-tls-pass-certificate-to-upstream` had no middleware handling these headers, so the values sent by the client reached the backend. An unauthenticated remote client can therefore present a forged client identity to a backend that trusts the proxy's verification result. \r\n\r\nThe issue was introduced in v3.7.15; earlier versions are not affected, and Traefik v2 is not affected since it does not include the Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider.\r\n\r\n## Patches\r\n\r\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.18\r\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.8.0-rc.2\r\n\r\n## For more information\r\n\r\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).","affected_stack":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"v3.7.15"},{"fixed":"v3.7.18"}]}],"fixed":["v3.7.18"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-ccgh-9g52-6vwg","relation":"self"},{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"v3.8.0-rc.1"},{"fixed":"v3.8.0-rc.2"}]}],"fixed":["v3.8.0-rc.2"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-ccgh-9g52-6vwg","relation":"self"}],"affected_other":[],"product_status":[],"records":[{"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source_id":"GHSA-ccgh-9g52-6vwg","relation":"self","url":"https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-ccgh-9g52-6vwg","license":"GitHub Terms of Service","published_at":"2026-11-12T10:01:22Z","modified_at":"2026-11-12T10:08:35Z","summary":"ingress-nginx client certificate authentication (auth-tls-secret) verification bypass and Ssl-Client-* header spoofing on shared hosts","details":"## Summary\r\n\r\nThere is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider when several Ingresses share a host configured for client certificate authentication with the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-tls-secret` annotation. Since v3.7.15 the client authentication applies to the whole host and the TLS handshake uses the settings of the first Ingress declaring it, but the `Ssl-Client-*` headers were still built from the annotations of each Ingress: an Ingress with `auth-tls-verify-client: on` sharing a host with an Ingress using `optional_no_ca` forwarded `Ssl-Client-Verify: SUCCESS`, together with the subject and issuer chosen by the client, for a certificate that was never verified, and an Ingress without its own `auth-tls-secret` or without `auth-tls-pass-certificate-to-upstream` had no middleware handling these headers, so the values sent by the client reached the backend. An unauthenticated remote client can therefore present a forged client identity to a backend that trusts the proxy's verification result. \r\n\r\nThe issue was introduced in v3.7.15; earlier versions are not affected, and Traefik v2 is not affected since it does not include the Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider.\r\n\r\n## Patches\r\n\r\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.18\r\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.8.0-rc.2\r\n\r\n## For more information\r\n\r\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V4","score":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N","source":"GHSA-ccgh-9g52-6vwg"}],"affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"v3.7.15"},{"fixed":"v3.7.18"}]}],"fixed":["v3.7.18"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-ccgh-9g52-6vwg","relation":"self"},{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"v3.8.0-rc.1"},{"fixed":"v3.8.0-rc.2"}]}],"fixed":["v3.8.0-rc.2"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-ccgh-9g52-6vwg","relation":"self"}],"product_status":[],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-ccgh-9g52-6vwg"}]}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-ccgh-9g52-6vwg"}],"sources":[{"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source_id":"GHSA-ccgh-9g52-6vwg","url":"https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-ccgh-9g52-6vwg","license":"GitHub Terms of Service","modified_at":"2026-11-12T10:08:35Z","relation":"self"}]}
