{"id":"GHSA-hhfc-p593-43hf","aliases":[],"summary":"Server: Information Disclosure with Fake Token in `client` mode","published_at":"2026-09-18T08:12:57Z","modified_at":"2026-09-18T08:12:58Z","products":[{"slug":"argo-workflows","name":"Argo Workflows / Rollouts / Events","category":"kubernetes-container"}],"rating":{"severity":"medium","score":5.3,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","attack_path":"internet_unauthenticated","user_interaction":false,"malicious":false},"fix_available":true,"kev":{"listed":false,"ransomware":false},"public_exploit":false,"exploits":[],"priority":7.3,"record_count":1,"vendors":["GitHub"],"details":"### Summary\r\n\r\nWhen using `--auth-mode=client`, some information about the Server can be retrieved with a fake or spoofed token. In particular, the [version of the Server](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/info/info_server.go#L54), which could be used to chain to known vulnerabilities.\r\n\r\n### Details\r\n\r\nNo authorization is performed by the Server on `client` tokens[^1]. Authorization is delegated to the k8s API server.\r\nHowever, the [Info Server API endpoints](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/info/info_server.go) do not interact with k8s[^2], and so any token that [_looks_](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/auth/mode.go#L37) [valid](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/auth/gatekeeper.go#L185) will be considered authenticated, even if it is not a k8s token or even if the token has no RBAC for Argo.\r\n\r\nThe same applies to any other endpoint that returns before making a Kubernetes API call. In current versions that includes `GetUserInfo`, which echoes back whatever claims the unverified token carries, `LintWorkflow`, and `CreateWorkflow` with `dryRun`. Both of the latter label the returned Workflow with a creator derived from the forged claims, and both resolve referenced templates through the Server's own informer (see GHSA-rcgr-27rh-g56w), so a forged token could be used to reach that disclosure without any Kubernetes credentials at all.\r\n\r\nThis dates back to #1965 / v2.5.0-rc1, which added the `info` endpoint. It only gave the managed namespace at the time and more information was added later, such as custom `links` in #2443 / v2.7.0-rc1, and `version` in #2740 / v2.8.0-rc2.\r\n\r\n### PoC\r\n\r\nFollowing the [\"Access Token\" documentation page](https://argo-workflows.readthedocs.io/en/release-3.5/access-token/), go to the [\"Token Creation\" section](https://argo-workflows.readthedocs.io/en/release-3.5/access-token/#token-creation). Instead of retrieving a token from k8s, make a fake one with a valid prefix:\r\n\r\n```sh\r\nARGO_TOKEN=\"Bearer faketoken\"\r\n```\r\n\r\nOn the same page, now go down to the [\"Token Usage & Test\" section](https://argo-workflows.readthedocs.io/en/release-3.5/access-token/#token-usage-test). Instead of retrieving Workflows, retrieve [the version](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/info/info_server.go#L54) using the fake token, which succeeds:\r\n```sh\r\ncurl https://localhost:2746/api/v1/version -H \"Authorization: $ARGO_TOKEN\"\r\n# {\"version\":\"latest+0918598.dirty\",\"buildDate\":\"2024-07-21T20:07:33Z\",\"gitCommit\":\"09185982630489236303a8cb8d647c112c954008\",\"gitTag\":\"untagged\",\"gitTreeState\":\"dirty\",\"goVersion\":\"go1.21.12\",\"compiler\":\"gc\",\"platform\":\"linux/amd64\"}\r\n```\r\n\r\nYou can also retrieve some configuration data from the [`info` endpoint](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/info/info_server.go#L39):\r\n```sh\r\ncurl https://localhost:2746/api/v1/info -H \"Authorization: $ARGO_TOKEN\"\r\n# {\"managedNamespace\":\"argo\",\"links\":[{\"name\":\"Workflow Link\",\"scope\":\"workflow\",\"url\":\"http://logging-facility?namespace=${metadata.namespace}\\u0026workflowName=${metadata.name}\\u0026startedAt=${status.startedAt}\\u0026finishedAt=${status.finishedAt}\"},{\"name\":\"Pod Link\",\"scope\":\"pod\",\"url\":\"http://logging-facility?namespace=${metadata.namespace}\\u0026podName=${metadata.name}\\u0026startedAt=${status.startedAt}\\u0026finishedAt=${status.finishedAt}\"},{\"name\":\"Pod Logs Link\",\"scope\":\"pod-logs\",\"url\":\"http://logging-facility?namespace=${metadata.namespace}\\u0026podName=${metadata.name}\\u0026startedAt=${status.startedAt}\\u0026finishedAt=${status.finishedAt}\"},{\"name\":\"Event Source Logs Link\",\"scope\":\"event-source-logs\",\"url\":\"http://logging-facility?namespace=${metadata.namespace}\\u0026podName=${metadata.name}\\u0026startedAt=${status.startedAt}\\u0026finishedAt=${status.finishedAt}\"},{\"name\":\"Sensor Logs Link\",\"scope\":\"sensor-logs\",\"url\":\"http://logging-facility?namespace=${metadata.namespace}\\u0026podName=${metadata.name}\\u0026startedAt=${status.startedAt}\\u0026finishedAt=${status.finishedAt}\"},{\"name\":\"Completed Workflows\",\"scope\":\"workflow-list\",\"url\":\"http://workflows?label=workflows.argoproj.io/completed=true\"}],\"modals\":{\"feedback\":true,\"firstTimeUser\":true,\"newVersion\":true},\"columns\":[{\"name\":\"Workflow Completed\",\"type\":\"label\",\"key\":\"workflows.argoproj.io/completed\"}]}\r\n```\r\n\r\nWhile the version is perhaps the most impactful, the `info` endpoint can also expose the `managedNamespace` and `links`, both of which could also be potentially useful information to an attacker.\r\n\r\n### Patches\r\n\r\nFixed in v4.1.4 and v4.0.12. In `--auth-mode=client` the Server now performs a Kubernetes `SelfSubjectReview` with the presented credentials before serving any request, and rejects the request with `401 Unauthenticated` if the API server refuses the token. Successful reviews are cached for `ARGO_SERVER_TOKEN_REVIEW_CACHE_TTL` (default `1m`; `0` disables the cache). This requires Kubernetes 1.28 or later, where `SelfSubjectReview` is generally available.\r\n\r\nv3 is not being patched. Users on v3 should upgrade.\r\n\r\n### Workarounds\r\n\r\nUse `--auth-mode=sso`, which validates tokens itself, or restrict network access to the Server so that only trusted clients can reach it.\r\n\r\n### Impact\r\n\r\nAll users of the Server with `--auth-mode=client` are vulnerable to this information disclosure.\r\n\r\n[^1]: `sso` tokens, on the other hand, are [immediately \"authorized\"](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/auth/gatekeeper.go#L207). The naming in the codebase is a bit confusing; it would be more appropriate to say \"authenticated\" in this case, as authorization is via SSO RBAC / SA matching / k8s API server. In this same section of the codebase, the `client` tokens are not authenticated, they are only validated. Authentication and authorization is done simultaneously for `client` tokens via the k8s API server.\r\n\r\n[^2]: Archived Workflows also do not retrieve information from k8s, but specifically do [the equivalent of a `kubectl auth can-i`](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/workflowarchive/archived_workflow_server.go#L50) check for their respective methods. Archived Workflows and Info were the first API endpoints identified that do not retrieve information from k8s; Lint and dry-run Create were identified later. Rather than adding manual authorization to each, the fix validates the token itself.","affected_stack":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.0.0"}]}],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-hhfc-p593-43hf","relation":"self"},{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"4.1.0"},{"fixed":"4.1.4"}]}],"fixed":["4.1.4"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-hhfc-p593-43hf","relation":"self"},{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"4.0.0"},{"fixed":"4.0.12"}]}],"fixed":["4.0.12"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-hhfc-p593-43hf","relation":"self"}],"affected_other":[],"product_status":[],"records":[{"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source_id":"GHSA-hhfc-p593-43hf","relation":"self","url":"https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-hhfc-p593-43hf","license":"GitHub Terms of Service","published_at":"2026-09-18T08:12:57Z","modified_at":"2026-09-18T08:12:58Z","summary":"Server: Information Disclosure with Fake Token in `client` mode","details":"### Summary\r\n\r\nWhen using `--auth-mode=client`, some information about the Server can be retrieved with a fake or spoofed token. In particular, the [version of the Server](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/info/info_server.go#L54), which could be used to chain to known vulnerabilities.\r\n\r\n### Details\r\n\r\nNo authorization is performed by the Server on `client` tokens[^1]. Authorization is delegated to the k8s API server.\r\nHowever, the [Info Server API endpoints](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/info/info_server.go) do not interact with k8s[^2], and so any token that [_looks_](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/auth/mode.go#L37) [valid](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/auth/gatekeeper.go#L185) will be considered authenticated, even if it is not a k8s token or even if the token has no RBAC for Argo.\r\n\r\nThe same applies to any other endpoint that returns before making a Kubernetes API call. In current versions that includes `GetUserInfo`, which echoes back whatever claims the unverified token carries, `LintWorkflow`, and `CreateWorkflow` with `dryRun`. Both of the latter label the returned Workflow with a creator derived from the forged claims, and both resolve referenced templates through the Server's own informer (see GHSA-rcgr-27rh-g56w), so a forged token could be used to reach that disclosure without any Kubernetes credentials at all.\r\n\r\nThis dates back to #1965 / v2.5.0-rc1, which added the `info` endpoint. It only gave the managed namespace at the time and more information was added later, such as custom `links` in #2443 / v2.7.0-rc1, and `version` in #2740 / v2.8.0-rc2.\r\n\r\n### PoC\r\n\r\nFollowing the [\"Access Token\" documentation page](https://argo-workflows.readthedocs.io/en/release-3.5/access-token/), go to the [\"Token Creation\" section](https://argo-workflows.readthedocs.io/en/release-3.5/access-token/#token-creation). Instead of retrieving a token from k8s, make a fake one with a valid prefix:\r\n\r\n```sh\r\nARGO_TOKEN=\"Bearer faketoken\"\r\n```\r\n\r\nOn the same page, now go down to the [\"Token Usage & Test\" section](https://argo-workflows.readthedocs.io/en/release-3.5/access-token/#token-usage-test). Instead of retrieving Workflows, retrieve [the version](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/info/info_server.go#L54) using the fake token, which succeeds:\r\n```sh\r\ncurl https://localhost:2746/api/v1/version -H \"Authorization: $ARGO_TOKEN\"\r\n# {\"version\":\"latest+0918598.dirty\",\"buildDate\":\"2024-07-21T20:07:33Z\",\"gitCommit\":\"09185982630489236303a8cb8d647c112c954008\",\"gitTag\":\"untagged\",\"gitTreeState\":\"dirty\",\"goVersion\":\"go1.21.12\",\"compiler\":\"gc\",\"platform\":\"linux/amd64\"}\r\n```\r\n\r\nYou can also retrieve some configuration data from the [`info` endpoint](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/info/info_server.go#L39):\r\n```sh\r\ncurl https://localhost:2746/api/v1/info -H \"Authorization: $ARGO_TOKEN\"\r\n# {\"managedNamespace\":\"argo\",\"links\":[{\"name\":\"Workflow Link\",\"scope\":\"workflow\",\"url\":\"http://logging-facility?namespace=${metadata.namespace}\\u0026workflowName=${metadata.name}\\u0026startedAt=${status.startedAt}\\u0026finishedAt=${status.finishedAt}\"},{\"name\":\"Pod Link\",\"scope\":\"pod\",\"url\":\"http://logging-facility?namespace=${metadata.namespace}\\u0026podName=${metadata.name}\\u0026startedAt=${status.startedAt}\\u0026finishedAt=${status.finishedAt}\"},{\"name\":\"Pod Logs Link\",\"scope\":\"pod-logs\",\"url\":\"http://logging-facility?namespace=${metadata.namespace}\\u0026podName=${metadata.name}\\u0026startedAt=${status.startedAt}\\u0026finishedAt=${status.finishedAt}\"},{\"name\":\"Event Source Logs Link\",\"scope\":\"event-source-logs\",\"url\":\"http://logging-facility?namespace=${metadata.namespace}\\u0026podName=${metadata.name}\\u0026startedAt=${status.startedAt}\\u0026finishedAt=${status.finishedAt}\"},{\"name\":\"Sensor Logs Link\",\"scope\":\"sensor-logs\",\"url\":\"http://logging-facility?namespace=${metadata.namespace}\\u0026podName=${metadata.name}\\u0026startedAt=${status.startedAt}\\u0026finishedAt=${status.finishedAt}\"},{\"name\":\"Completed Workflows\",\"scope\":\"workflow-list\",\"url\":\"http://workflows?label=workflows.argoproj.io/completed=true\"}],\"modals\":{\"feedback\":true,\"firstTimeUser\":true,\"newVersion\":true},\"columns\":[{\"name\":\"Workflow Completed\",\"type\":\"label\",\"key\":\"workflows.argoproj.io/completed\"}]}\r\n```\r\n\r\nWhile the version is perhaps the most impactful, the `info` endpoint can also expose the `managedNamespace` and `links`, both of which could also be potentially useful information to an attacker.\r\n\r\n### Patches\r\n\r\nFixed in v4.1.4 and v4.0.12. In `--auth-mode=client` the Server now performs a Kubernetes `SelfSubjectReview` with the presented credentials before serving any request, and rejects the request with `401 Unauthenticated` if the API server refuses the token. Successful reviews are cached for `ARGO_SERVER_TOKEN_REVIEW_CACHE_TTL` (default `1m`; `0` disables the cache). This requires Kubernetes 1.28 or later, where `SelfSubjectReview` is generally available.\r\n\r\nv3 is not being patched. Users on v3 should upgrade.\r\n\r\n### Workarounds\r\n\r\nUse `--auth-mode=sso`, which validates tokens itself, or restrict network access to the Server so that only trusted clients can reach it.\r\n\r\n### Impact\r\n\r\nAll users of the Server with `--auth-mode=client` are vulnerable to this information disclosure.\r\n\r\n[^1]: `sso` tokens, on the other hand, are [immediately \"authorized\"](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/auth/gatekeeper.go#L207). The naming in the codebase is a bit confusing; it would be more appropriate to say \"authenticated\" in this case, as authorization is via SSO RBAC / SA matching / k8s API server. In this same section of the codebase, the `client` tokens are not authenticated, they are only validated. Authentication and authorization is done simultaneously for `client` tokens via the k8s API server.\r\n\r\n[^2]: Archived Workflows also do not retrieve information from k8s, but specifically do [the equivalent of a `kubectl auth can-i`](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/52cca7e079a4f6d76db303ac550b1876e51b3865/server/workflowarchive/archived_workflow_server.go#L50) check for their respective methods. Archived Workflows and Info were the first API endpoints identified that do not retrieve information from k8s; Lint and dry-run Create were identified later. Rather than adding manual authorization to each, the fix validates the token itself.","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N","source":"GHSA-hhfc-p593-43hf"}],"affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.0.0"}]}],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-hhfc-p593-43hf","relation":"self"},{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"4.1.0"},{"fixed":"4.1.4"}]}],"fixed":["4.1.4"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-hhfc-p593-43hf","relation":"self"},{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"4.0.0"},{"fixed":"4.0.12"}]}],"fixed":["4.0.12"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-hhfc-p593-43hf","relation":"self"}],"product_status":[],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-hhfc-p593-43hf"}]}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-hhfc-p593-43hf"}],"sources":[{"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source_id":"GHSA-hhfc-p593-43hf","url":"https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-hhfc-p593-43hf","license":"GitHub Terms of Service","modified_at":"2026-09-18T08:12:58Z","relation":"self"}]}
