{"id":"GHSA-qm9f-w54v-q2qh","aliases":[],"summary":"Preauthenticated Negotiate contaminates Traefik's globally shared backend connection pool","published_at":"2026-10-07T08:47:33Z","modified_at":"2026-10-07T08:47:33Z","products":[{"slug":"traefik","name":"Traefik","category":"proxy"}],"rating":{"severity":"high","score":7,"vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N","attack_path":"internet_unauthenticated","user_interaction":false,"malicious":false},"fix_available":true,"kev":{"listed":false,"ransomware":false},"public_exploit":false,"exploits":[],"priority":9,"record_count":1,"vendors":["GitHub"],"details":"## Summary\n\nThere is a high severity authentication vulnerability in Traefik's handling of connection-bound backend authentication (NTLM and SPNEGO/Kerberos \"Negotiate\"). For each new frontend connection, Traefik sends the first backend request through a globally shared transport and only switches that connection to an isolated, per-frontend-connection transport *after* it observes an NTLM/Negotiate challenge in the backend's response. When a client preauthenticates — sending a valid `Authorization: Negotiate` token on its first request instead of following the standard challenge-first (`401`) handshake — the backend authenticates the shared-pool connection on that first request and returns a successful response. Because isolation is decided only after the response is seen, the now victim-authenticated backend socket remains in the shared pool, and it is neither drained nor closed. An unrelated, unauthenticated client on a completely separate frontend connection can then be assigned that socket and act with the victim's identity, performing victim-authorized reads or writes.\n\nExploitation requires Traefik to proxy a connection-bound NTLM/Negotiate backend with connection reuse enabled, and a legitimate client that preauthenticates rather than following the standard challenge-first handshake. The ordinary challenge-first flow is not affected: it installs a dedicated backend transport before the credential-bearing request, so the authenticated socket never enters the shared pool. This is a distinct issue from GHSA-qqjf-53cj-pwvv (which fixed a missing HTTP/3 transport holder): it occurs on ordinary HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 frontend connections because the credential-bearing first request reaches the shared pool before any holder can isolate it. The behavior was introduced together with connection-bound NTLM/Kerberos support in v2.11.0 and v3.0.0. Traefik v3.0 through v3.6 are end-of-life and are also affected; they will not receive a fix on their own line, and users on those versions must upgrade to v3.7.14.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.58\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.14\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).","affected_stack":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/traefik/traefik/v2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"v2.11.0"},{"fixed":"v2.11.58"}]}],"fixed":["v2.11.58"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-qm9f-w54v-q2qh","relation":"self"},{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"v3.0.0"},{"fixed":"v3.7.14"}]}],"fixed":["v3.7.14"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-qm9f-w54v-q2qh","relation":"self"}],"affected_other":[],"product_status":[],"records":[{"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source_id":"GHSA-qm9f-w54v-q2qh","relation":"self","url":"https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-qm9f-w54v-q2qh","license":"GitHub Terms of Service","published_at":"2026-10-07T08:47:33Z","modified_at":"2026-10-07T08:47:33Z","summary":"Preauthenticated Negotiate contaminates Traefik's globally shared backend connection pool","details":"## Summary\n\nThere is a high severity authentication vulnerability in Traefik's handling of connection-bound backend authentication (NTLM and SPNEGO/Kerberos \"Negotiate\"). For each new frontend connection, Traefik sends the first backend request through a globally shared transport and only switches that connection to an isolated, per-frontend-connection transport *after* it observes an NTLM/Negotiate challenge in the backend's response. When a client preauthenticates — sending a valid `Authorization: Negotiate` token on its first request instead of following the standard challenge-first (`401`) handshake — the backend authenticates the shared-pool connection on that first request and returns a successful response. Because isolation is decided only after the response is seen, the now victim-authenticated backend socket remains in the shared pool, and it is neither drained nor closed. An unrelated, unauthenticated client on a completely separate frontend connection can then be assigned that socket and act with the victim's identity, performing victim-authorized reads or writes.\n\nExploitation requires Traefik to proxy a connection-bound NTLM/Negotiate backend with connection reuse enabled, and a legitimate client that preauthenticates rather than following the standard challenge-first handshake. The ordinary challenge-first flow is not affected: it installs a dedicated backend transport before the credential-bearing request, so the authenticated socket never enters the shared pool. This is a distinct issue from GHSA-qqjf-53cj-pwvv (which fixed a missing HTTP/3 transport holder): it occurs on ordinary HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 frontend connections because the credential-bearing first request reaches the shared pool before any holder can isolate it. The behavior was introduced together with connection-bound NTLM/Kerberos support in v2.11.0 and v3.0.0. Traefik v3.0 through v3.6 are end-of-life and are also affected; they will not receive a fix on their own line, and users on those versions must upgrade to v3.7.14.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.58\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.14\n\n## For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V4","score":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N","source":"GHSA-qm9f-w54v-q2qh"}],"affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/traefik/traefik/v2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"v2.11.0"},{"fixed":"v2.11.58"}]}],"fixed":["v2.11.58"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-qm9f-w54v-q2qh","relation":"self"},{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"v3.0.0"},{"fixed":"v3.7.14"}]}],"fixed":["v3.7.14"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-qm9f-w54v-q2qh","relation":"self"}],"product_status":[],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-qm9f-w54v-q2qh"}]}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-qm9f-w54v-q2qh"}],"sources":[{"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source_id":"GHSA-qm9f-w54v-q2qh","url":"https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-qm9f-w54v-q2qh","license":"GitHub Terms of Service","modified_at":"2026-10-07T08:47:33Z","relation":"self"}]}
