{"id":"GHSA-rq7v-q562-vwcq","aliases":[],"summary":"Symlinks in a tar archive allow writing files outside the extraction directory","published_at":"2026-11-20T03:49:28Z","modified_at":"2026-11-20T03:49:28Z","products":[{"slug":"argo-cd","name":"Argo CD","category":"gitops-cicd"}],"rating":{"severity":"high","score":8.5,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L","attack_path":"internet_authenticated","user_interaction":false,"malicious":false},"fix_available":true,"kev":{"listed":false,"ransomware":false},"public_exploit":false,"exploits":[],"priority":10.5,"record_count":1,"vendors":["GitHub"],"details":"### Impact\n\nWhen extracting a tar archive, Argo CD checked each entry's destination path by its text only, without resolving symlinks that earlier entries in the same archive had already created. An archive could create a symlink inside the destination, then a second symlink through it that pointed outside, and then a regular file through that chain. The file was then written to a location of the attacker's choice outside the extraction directory, and extraction reported success.\n\nTwo components extract archives supplied by the caller:\n\n* **repo-server**, through the `GetManifestsWithFiles` API used for local diffs and syncs. Any user who can view an Application, which includes the built-in `role:readonly`, can send an archive. In a standard deployment the repo-server's writable locations are `/tmp` and its mounted volumes, where an attacker can tamper with other Applications' repository checkouts and cached charts.\n* **Config Management Plugin (CMP) sidecars**, which receive archives from the repo-server. A sidecar usually has a writable filesystem, so a file write there can replace the plugin's own executable and run code with the plugin's credentials on the next manifest generation.\n\nAll versions from v2.4.0 onward are affected, up to the patched versions below. Archive extraction was introduced in [41db81247](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/41db812474b3f81e02a0ef82761d6d0f006afc34) ([#8600](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/pull/8600)).\n\n### Patches\n\nA patch for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo CD versions:\n\n* v3.6.0 (and v3.6.0-rc3)\n* v3.5.5\n* v3.4.11\n* v3.3.16\n\nExtraction now goes through Go's `os.Root`, which refuses to write outside the destination directory, and rejects entries whose parent path contains a symlink.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n* Restrict who can view Applications (`applications, get`) using [RBAC](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/rbac/). The built-in `role:readonly` grants it to every authenticated user by default.\n* Run the repo-server and CMP sidecars with `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true`, which the default manifests set for the repo-server, so that the only writable locations are temporary volumes.\n\n### Credits\n\nThe Argo CD team would like to thank @savio-doyensec of Doyensec, in collaboration with @claude and Anthropic Research, for discovering and responsibly disclosing this issue, and @AdamKorcz and @iabdullah215 for independently reporting it.\n\n### References\n\n* Fix: [484181673](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/484181673835e1edede6b8652bdd4fc4fd84a917) ([#28881](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/pull/28881))\n* Introducing commit: [41db81247](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/41db812474b3f81e02a0ef82761d6d0f006afc34) ([#8600](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/pull/8600)), first released in v2.4.0\n\n### For more information\n\n* Open an issue in [the Argo CD issue tracker](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/issues) or [discussions](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/discussions)\n* Join us on [Slack](https://argoproj.github.io/community/join-slack) in channel #argo-cd","affected_stack":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.4.0"}]}],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-rq7v-q562-vwcq","relation":"self"},{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.3.16 || >= 3.4.0"}]},{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.4.0"},{"fixed":"3.4.11 || >= 3.5.0"}]},{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.5.0"},{"fixed":"3.6.0-rc3"}]}],"fixed":["3.3.16 || >= 3.4.0","3.4.11 || >= 3.5.0","3.6.0-rc3"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-rq7v-q562-vwcq","relation":"self"}],"affected_other":[],"product_status":[],"records":[{"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source_id":"GHSA-rq7v-q562-vwcq","relation":"self","url":"https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/security/advisories/GHSA-rq7v-q562-vwcq","license":"GitHub Terms of Service","published_at":"2026-11-20T03:49:28Z","modified_at":"2026-11-20T03:49:28Z","summary":"Symlinks in a tar archive allow writing files outside the extraction directory","details":"### Impact\n\nWhen extracting a tar archive, Argo CD checked each entry's destination path by its text only, without resolving symlinks that earlier entries in the same archive had already created. An archive could create a symlink inside the destination, then a second symlink through it that pointed outside, and then a regular file through that chain. The file was then written to a location of the attacker's choice outside the extraction directory, and extraction reported success.\n\nTwo components extract archives supplied by the caller:\n\n* **repo-server**, through the `GetManifestsWithFiles` API used for local diffs and syncs. Any user who can view an Application, which includes the built-in `role:readonly`, can send an archive. In a standard deployment the repo-server's writable locations are `/tmp` and its mounted volumes, where an attacker can tamper with other Applications' repository checkouts and cached charts.\n* **Config Management Plugin (CMP) sidecars**, which receive archives from the repo-server. A sidecar usually has a writable filesystem, so a file write there can replace the plugin's own executable and run code with the plugin's credentials on the next manifest generation.\n\nAll versions from v2.4.0 onward are affected, up to the patched versions below. Archive extraction was introduced in [41db81247](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/41db812474b3f81e02a0ef82761d6d0f006afc34) ([#8600](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/pull/8600)).\n\n### Patches\n\nA patch for this vulnerability has been released in the following Argo CD versions:\n\n* v3.6.0 (and v3.6.0-rc3)\n* v3.5.5\n* v3.4.11\n* v3.3.16\n\nExtraction now goes through Go's `os.Root`, which refuses to write outside the destination directory, and rejects entries whose parent path contains a symlink.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n* Restrict who can view Applications (`applications, get`) using [RBAC](https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/rbac/). The built-in `role:readonly` grants it to every authenticated user by default.\n* Run the repo-server and CMP sidecars with `readOnlyRootFilesystem: true`, which the default manifests set for the repo-server, so that the only writable locations are temporary volumes.\n\n### Credits\n\nThe Argo CD team would like to thank @savio-doyensec of Doyensec, in collaboration with @claude and Anthropic Research, for discovering and responsibly disclosing this issue, and @AdamKorcz and @iabdullah215 for independently reporting it.\n\n### References\n\n* Fix: [484181673](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/484181673835e1edede6b8652bdd4fc4fd84a917) ([#28881](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/pull/28881))\n* Introducing commit: [41db81247](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/41db812474b3f81e02a0ef82761d6d0f006afc34) ([#8600](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/pull/8600)), first released in v2.4.0\n\n### For more information\n\n* Open an issue in [the Argo CD issue tracker](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/issues) or [discussions](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/discussions)\n* Join us on [Slack](https://argoproj.github.io/community/join-slack) in channel #argo-cd","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L","source":"GHSA-rq7v-q562-vwcq"}],"affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"2.4.0"}]}],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-rq7v-q562-vwcq","relation":"self"},{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"3.3.16 || >= 3.4.0"}]},{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.4.0"},{"fixed":"3.4.11 || >= 3.5.0"}]},{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"3.5.0"},{"fixed":"3.6.0-rc3"}]}],"fixed":["3.3.16 || >= 3.4.0","3.4.11 || >= 3.5.0","3.6.0-rc3"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-rq7v-q562-vwcq","relation":"self"}],"product_status":[],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/security/advisories/GHSA-rq7v-q562-vwcq"}]}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/security/advisories/GHSA-rq7v-q562-vwcq"}],"sources":[{"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source_id":"GHSA-rq7v-q562-vwcq","url":"https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/security/advisories/GHSA-rq7v-q562-vwcq","license":"GitHub Terms of Service","modified_at":"2026-11-20T03:49:28Z","relation":"self"}]}
