{"id":"GHSA-rv6w-8qqv-7v6p","aliases":[],"summary":"CA key passphrase is passed to the network-facing frontend process","published_at":"2026-10-13T09:29:47Z","modified_at":"2026-10-13T09:29:47Z","products":[{"slug":"puppet","name":"Puppet / OpenVox","category":"iac"}],"rating":{"severity":"medium","score":5.9,"vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","attack_path":"internet_unauthenticated","user_interaction":false,"malicious":false},"fix_available":true,"kev":{"listed":false,"ransomware":false},"public_exploit":false,"exploits":[],"priority":7.9,"record_count":1,"vendors":["GitHub"],"details":"Before commit `76cd75ef1e0e`, the launcher stripped three internal variables before spawning its children, but `PUPPET_CA_KEY_PASSPHRASE` was not one of them. The frontend, which terminates TLS and parses untrusted input, therefore held the CA key passphrase in its environment for its whole life. Keeping the key out of that process is what the signer split exists to do.\r\n\r\nFound in an independent audit at `fb856f1` and re-checked against `main` at `145cb53`.\r\n\r\n## Where\r\n\r\nLine numbers are as of `145cb53`, before the fix.\r\n\r\n- `cmd/openvox-ca/launcher.go:374`: `internalEnvKeys = []string{\"PUPPET_CA_ROLE\", \"PUPPET_CA_DAEMON\", \"PUPPET_CA_SIGNER_PSK\"}`.\r\n- `launcher.go:132` built `baseEnv := filterEnv(os.Environ(), internalEnvKeys...)`, and `launcher.go:148` passed it to the frontend unchanged.\r\n- `internal/ca/keyenc.go:170` makes `PUPPET_CA_KEY_PASSPHRASE` the default passphrase source.\r\n\r\nThe comment above `baseEnv` explained why the signer PSK goes over a pipe and is never left in a child's environment. The passphrase got none of that care.\r\n\r\n## Impact\r\n\r\nThe variable sat in the frontend's heap and in `/proc/<pid>/environ`. Both children run as the same uid, and the frontend can read the stored CA key. A memory or file disclosure bug in the HTTP layer then gave an attacker the encrypted key and its passphrase together. So did a debugging endpoint, a core dump or a crash reporter. Preventing that combination is what the isolation design is for.\r\n\r\nThis needs a second bug to exploit. It was reported privately because it removed the defence that is supposed to contain that second bug.\r\n\r\n## Fix\r\n\r\nFixed on `main` on 2026-10-13 in commit [`76cd75ef1e0eda13dd609caebfdcb1279b938764`](https://github.com/voxpupuli/openvox-ca/commit/76cd75ef1e0eda13dd609caebfdcb1279b938764) (PR #477, closes #472), Go module version `v0.0.0-20261013092612-76cd75ef1e0e`.\r\n\r\n- The launcher now builds the frontend's environment separately and withholds `PUPPET_CA_KEY_PASSPHRASE` from it, along with every `BAO_*` and `VAULT_*` variable, which the OpenBao client library reads for itself. The frontend never reads the passphrase and never talks to OpenBao. The signer receives all of them as before.\r\n- The rest of the `PUPPET_CA_*` configuration still reaches the frontend, which reads its own settings from it. The OpenBao credentials among those settings are file paths, not the credentials themselves.\r\n- An end-to-end spec runs the real launcher and reads back each child's exec environment, so a change that hands the frontend the passphrase or the signer's environment fails it.\r\n- `docs/ca-key-security.md` now says what the process split does not cover. It keeps the key out of the frontend's memory, so a disclosure bug cannot leak it, but it does not stand between the key and code running in the frontend. Both children run as the same user, and the frontend can read the stored key and whatever the signer reads its passphrase from.\r\n\r\n`--single-process` has no frontend, and so no split to protect.\r\n\r\n## What to do\r\n\r\nMove to a build that includes `76cd75ef1e0e` (2026-10-13 or later), and restart the service so that the frontend is re-executed with the reduced environment.\r\n\r\nTo protect the key against code running in the frontend, as well as against memory disclosure, use OpenBao Transit key custody: the key is created inside OpenBao and never leaves it. Encryption at rest (`encrypt_ca_key`) protects the stored key wherever it travels on its own, such as in backups, database dumps and replicas, but not from the service user. On earlier builds, `ca_key_passphrase_file` (or `PUPPET_CA_KEY_PASSPHRASE_FILE`) instead of `PUPPET_CA_KEY_PASSPHRASE` keeps the passphrase out of the frontend's environment, though the frontend can still read the file.","affected_stack":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/voxpupuli/openvox-ca","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.0-20261013092612-76cd75ef1e0e"}]}],"fixed":["0.0.0-20261013092612-76cd75ef1e0e"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-rv6w-8qqv-7v6p","relation":"self"}],"affected_other":[],"product_status":[],"records":[{"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source_id":"GHSA-rv6w-8qqv-7v6p","relation":"self","url":"https://github.com/voxpupuli/openvox-ca/security/advisories/GHSA-rv6w-8qqv-7v6p","license":"GitHub Terms of Service","published_at":"2026-10-13T09:29:47Z","modified_at":"2026-10-13T09:29:47Z","summary":"CA key passphrase is passed to the network-facing frontend process","details":"Before commit `76cd75ef1e0e`, the launcher stripped three internal variables before spawning its children, but `PUPPET_CA_KEY_PASSPHRASE` was not one of them. The frontend, which terminates TLS and parses untrusted input, therefore held the CA key passphrase in its environment for its whole life. Keeping the key out of that process is what the signer split exists to do.\r\n\r\nFound in an independent audit at `fb856f1` and re-checked against `main` at `145cb53`.\r\n\r\n## Where\r\n\r\nLine numbers are as of `145cb53`, before the fix.\r\n\r\n- `cmd/openvox-ca/launcher.go:374`: `internalEnvKeys = []string{\"PUPPET_CA_ROLE\", \"PUPPET_CA_DAEMON\", \"PUPPET_CA_SIGNER_PSK\"}`.\r\n- `launcher.go:132` built `baseEnv := filterEnv(os.Environ(), internalEnvKeys...)`, and `launcher.go:148` passed it to the frontend unchanged.\r\n- `internal/ca/keyenc.go:170` makes `PUPPET_CA_KEY_PASSPHRASE` the default passphrase source.\r\n\r\nThe comment above `baseEnv` explained why the signer PSK goes over a pipe and is never left in a child's environment. The passphrase got none of that care.\r\n\r\n## Impact\r\n\r\nThe variable sat in the frontend's heap and in `/proc/<pid>/environ`. Both children run as the same uid, and the frontend can read the stored CA key. A memory or file disclosure bug in the HTTP layer then gave an attacker the encrypted key and its passphrase together. So did a debugging endpoint, a core dump or a crash reporter. Preventing that combination is what the isolation design is for.\r\n\r\nThis needs a second bug to exploit. It was reported privately because it removed the defence that is supposed to contain that second bug.\r\n\r\n## Fix\r\n\r\nFixed on `main` on 2026-10-13 in commit [`76cd75ef1e0eda13dd609caebfdcb1279b938764`](https://github.com/voxpupuli/openvox-ca/commit/76cd75ef1e0eda13dd609caebfdcb1279b938764) (PR #477, closes #472), Go module version `v0.0.0-20261013092612-76cd75ef1e0e`.\r\n\r\n- The launcher now builds the frontend's environment separately and withholds `PUPPET_CA_KEY_PASSPHRASE` from it, along with every `BAO_*` and `VAULT_*` variable, which the OpenBao client library reads for itself. The frontend never reads the passphrase and never talks to OpenBao. The signer receives all of them as before.\r\n- The rest of the `PUPPET_CA_*` configuration still reaches the frontend, which reads its own settings from it. The OpenBao credentials among those settings are file paths, not the credentials themselves.\r\n- An end-to-end spec runs the real launcher and reads back each child's exec environment, so a change that hands the frontend the passphrase or the signer's environment fails it.\r\n- `docs/ca-key-security.md` now says what the process split does not cover. It keeps the key out of the frontend's memory, so a disclosure bug cannot leak it, but it does not stand between the key and code running in the frontend. Both children run as the same user, and the frontend can read the stored key and whatever the signer reads its passphrase from.\r\n\r\n`--single-process` has no frontend, and so no split to protect.\r\n\r\n## What to do\r\n\r\nMove to a build that includes `76cd75ef1e0e` (2026-10-13 or later), and restart the service so that the frontend is re-executed with the reduced environment.\r\n\r\nTo protect the key against code running in the frontend, as well as against memory disclosure, use OpenBao Transit key custody: the key is created inside OpenBao and never leaves it. Encryption at rest (`encrypt_ca_key`) protects the stored key wherever it travels on its own, such as in backups, database dumps and replicas, but not from the service user. On earlier builds, `ca_key_passphrase_file` (or `PUPPET_CA_KEY_PASSPHRASE_FILE`) instead of `PUPPET_CA_KEY_PASSPHRASE` keeps the passphrase out of the frontend's environment, though the frontend can still read the file.","severity":[{"type":"CVSS_V3","score":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","source":"GHSA-rv6w-8qqv-7v6p"}],"affected":[{"ecosystem":"Go","package":"github.com/voxpupuli/openvox-ca","ranges":[{"type":"ECOSYSTEM","events":[{"introduced":"0"},{"fixed":"0.0.0-20261013092612-76cd75ef1e0e"}]}],"fixed":["0.0.0-20261013092612-76cd75ef1e0e"],"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source":"GHSA-rv6w-8qqv-7v6p","relation":"self"}],"product_status":[],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/voxpupuli/openvox-ca/security/advisories/GHSA-rv6w-8qqv-7v6p"}]}],"references":[{"type":"ADVISORY","url":"https://github.com/voxpupuli/openvox-ca/security/advisories/GHSA-rv6w-8qqv-7v6p"}],"sources":[{"provider":"github-repo-advisories","source_id":"GHSA-rv6w-8qqv-7v6p","url":"https://github.com/voxpupuli/openvox-ca/security/advisories/GHSA-rv6w-8qqv-7v6p","license":"GitHub Terms of Service","modified_at":"2026-10-13T09:29:47Z","relation":"self"}]}
