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ClusterSecretStore reconciler disable bypass through sourceRef.storeRef

GHSA-ghx2-3pvr-6px5

Hoch · CVSS 7.7 Netzwerk · mit Login Fix verfügbar

Veröffentlicht
10.11.2026 13:38
Zuletzt geändert
11.11.2026
EPSS (30 Tage)
unbekannt
CVSS-Vektor
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Beschreibung

Originaltext der Quelle, nicht übersetzt.

## Impact On affected versions, a user who can create or modify an ExternalSecret can cause ESO to read from a ClusterSecretStore despite `--enable-cluster-store-reconciler=false` (Helm `processClusterStore=false`) on certain conditions. This defeats a deployer's intended restriction on cluster-scoped store use. `PushSecret` processing also ignored this setting. A user with permission to create or modify a `PushSecret` could cause ESO to write, overwrite, or delete external secrets through a cluster store, subject to provider capabilities and the configured policies. Exploitation requires an existing ClusterSecretStore that ESO can still read and use. Its namespace conditions, controller-class restrictions, and provider permissions continue to apply. For `ExternalSecret` reads, the store must retain a `Ready=True` status from previous reconciliation, or the flood gate must be disabled. `PushSecret` processing does not use the flood gate and therefore does not require this readiness condition. Deployments whose effective RBAC already prevents ESO from reading cluster stores are protected against these paths. ## Workarounds For deployments that cannot immediately upgrade: 1) If you set `--enable-cluster-store-reconciler=false`, then delete all the `ClusterSecretStore` in your k8s cluster if you can. 2) If you cannot (multi-controller cases and some controller MUST have `ClusterSecretStore` and a CRD): - Remove read access to `ClusterSecretStores` for controllers who do not need access to them and restart ESO to clear any cached store objects. - Use admission policies to block cluster-store references. Cover `ExternalSecret.spec.secretStoreRef`, `spec.data[].sourceRef.storeRef`, and `spec.dataFrom[].sourceRef.storeRef`, plus `PushSecret.spec.secretStoreRefs` and `spec.dataTo[].storeRef`. Audit and migrate existing resources too: admission policies alone do not stop existing references or cleanup driven by `PushSecret` status. - Disable `PushSecret` processing if it is unnecessary. Set `--enable-push-secret-reconciler=false` or Helm `processPushSecret=false`. This addresses the push path only. Keeping the flood gate enabled is not sufficient protection because a previously working cluster store can retain Ready=True after reconciliation is disabled. ## Background `ExternalSecrets` can select a store globally or override it for individual entries (through `storeRef`). The affected implementation checked the disabling flag only against the global reference, while provider-client resolution preferred per-entry references. `PushSecret` processing did not check the flag. Store readiness is separate from this configuration boundary. Disabling the cluster-store controller does not erase previously recorded readiness status, allowing an existing store to remain usable through the unchecked paths. The fixed implementation: - Checks all `ExternalSecret` store-reference locations before fetching provider data. - Checks `PushSecret` references, including label selectors, `dataTo` entries, and cluster stores recorded in `status.syncedPushSecrets`, before pushing or deleting. - Does not start the `ClusterSecretStore` controller when the flag is false. - Protects `ClusterPushSecret` operations through the same checks on its generated `PushSecrets`. Affected resources are skipped entirely, including `PushSecrets` mixing namespaced and cluster stores. **Previously synchronized secrets are not automatically removed.** `PushSecret` cleanup also stops, so remote secrets may remain and deleting resources may retain finalizers until an administrator completes migration or cleanup.

Betroffene Pakete im beobachteten Stack

Gogithub.com/external-secrets/external-secrets0.7.0 → 2.15.0GHSA-ghx2-3pvr-6px5

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