- Veröffentlicht
- 03.11.2026 21:05
- Zuletzt geändert
- 03.11.2026
- EPSS (30 Tage)
- unbekannt
- CVSS-Vektor
- CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Beschreibung
Originaltext der Quelle, nicht übersetzt.
### Summary
Flawed hostname ACL check allows attackers to impersonate puppet clients with enabled autosign and allows puppet catalog downloads for arbitrary hosts.
### Details
ACL checks for authorized endpoints like GET /puppet/v3/catalog/target.lab.local are processed at the puppetmaster
in the following clojure code:
https://github.com/OpenVoxProject/trapperkeeper-authorization/blob/e686fe844ceeb9a7884eeaa0d7f9fe0d6b265a47/src/puppetlabs/trapperkeeper/authorization/acl.clj#L122-L130
```clojure
;; splits "target.lab.local" -> ("local" "lab" "target")
(schema/defn ^:private split-domain :- [schema/Str]
"Given a domain string, split it on '.' and reverse it. For examples,
'sylvia.plath.net' becomes ('net' 'plath' 'sylvia'). This is used for domain
matching."
[domain :- schema/Str]
(-> domain
(string/lower-case)
(string/split #"\.")
reverse))
```
-> https://github.com/OpenVoxProject/trapperkeeper-authorization/blob/0fad59303b6046891ce0002843e48cf0965ce3ea/src/puppetlabs/trapperkeeper/authorization/acl.clj#L197-L204
```clojure
(schema/defn ^:private match-domain? :- schema/Bool
"Checks that name matches the given ace"
[{:keys [value match]} :- ACE
to-match :- schema/Str]
(let [match-split-domain (split-domain to-match)]
(if (= :regex match)
(boolean (re-find (re-pattern value) to-match)) ;; zips the two reversed-segment lists and stops at the SHORTER one, then requires every zipped pair to be equal. No length comparison
(every? (fn [[a b]] (= a b)) (map vector value match-split-domain)))))
```
The zip-like code in match-domain will stop at the shorter hostname entry and compare the zipped values without a length comparison. This means that a cert issued for evil.target.lab.local will match target.lab.local. With autosign enabled (which is not default, but common in real world deployments), this will lead to the following attack scenario:
* Attacker does CSR to puppet with evil.somehost.company.tld. As this host ist not registered yet, a cert for client auth will be issued
* Attacker uses the cert for evil.somehost.company.tld to impersonate somehost.company.tld, e.g
* Grab puppet catalog with provisioned secrets
* Push fake facts / software versions to the puppet master
### Proof of concept
* Create CSR for host with openssl
* Send CSR to `/puppet-ca/v1/certificate_request/<certname>`
* Retrieve certificate from `/puppet-ca/v1/certificate/<certname>`
* Use client authentication to download catalog of impersonated host via `/puppet/v3/catalog/<certname>?environment=<puppet_env>`
### Impact
access data from other nodes
### Related
This vulnerability also affects Puppet Enterprise, including impacts to other integrated components.
* `CVE-2026-115732 – Certificate Name Authorization Bypass – CVSS 4.0: 9.0 (Critical)`
Betroffene Pakete im beobachteten Stack
GitHubOpenVoxProject/trapperkeeper-authorization/OpenVox Server9.2.0 and 8.18.0GHSA-q4hm-33rc-572g
GitHubOpenVoxProject/trapperkeeper-authorization/OpenVoxDB9.2.0 and 8.18.0GHSA-q4hm-33rc-572g
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