- Veröffentlicht
- 13.10.2026 11:24
- Zuletzt geändert
- 13.10.2026
- EPSS (30 Tage)
- unbekannt
- CVSS-Vektor
- CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Beschreibung
Originaltext der Quelle, nicht übersetzt.
The OpenBao Transit signer builds its client with `api.DefaultConfig()`, which reads the `BAO_*` environment (falling back to `VAULT_*`). Before commit `6740ab96dc28`, nothing documented this or reported it. A stray `VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY=1` in the signer's environment silently turned off server certificate verification on the connection that carries the AppRole login and the signing token.
Found in an independent audit at `fb856f1` and re-checked against `main` at `145cb53` with `openbao/api/v2 v2.7.1`.
## Where
Line numbers are as of `145cb53`, before the fix.
- `internal/signer/openbao/client.go:31`: `openBaoCfg := api.DefaultConfig()`. `DisableEnvironment` is never set.
- In `openbao/api/v2@v2.7.1`, `DefaultConfig` calls `ReadEnvironment()` (`client.go:401-406`). That reads `BAO_SKIP_VERIFY` (`:585-590`), `BAO_PROXY_ADDR` and `BAO_HTTP_PROXY` (`:604-611`), `BAO_TOKEN` (`:820-821`) and others. `ReadBaoVariable` (`env.go:22-34`) falls back to the `VAULT_*` names.
- The later `ConfigureTLS` call only ever sets `InsecureSkipVerify = true` (`client.go:463-465`). It never clears a value the environment already set.
- The signer child gets `signerEnv(baseEnv)` (`cmd/openvox-ca/launcher.go:143`), which removes only `NOTIFY_SOCKET`, so these variables reach it.
`docs/openbao-transit.md` and `docs/configuration.md` listed the `PUPPET_CA_OPENBAO_*` settings and said nothing about `BAO_*` or `VAULT_*`.
## Reproduction
On a build before the fix, start the signer with `VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY=1` against an OpenBao endpoint that presents a certificate the configured CA file does not trust. The connection succeeds, and nothing is logged.
## Impact
`VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY` and `VAULT_ADDR`-style variables are common in developer shells, CI runners and container base environments. If one leaks into the CA's unit file or pod spec, an on-path attacker can take the Transit token and sign anything as the CA. `BAO_PROXY_ADDR` redirects the connection outright. Before the fix, nothing in the logs or docs pointed the operator at the cause.
## Fix
Fixed on `main` on 2026-10-13 in commit [`6740ab96dc2843497067948808ae11141bc9a35f`](https://github.com/voxpupuli/openvox-ca/commit/6740ab96dc2843497067948808ae11141bc9a35f) (PR #482, closes #474), Go module version `v0.0.0-20261013091901-6740ab96dc28`.
openvox-ca deliberately keeps honouring the OpenBao client's environment, the same variables the `bao` CLI reads, so that an administrator can still use them. Ignoring them outright would remove a standard way to configure the client. Instead, the fix makes them visible:
- The signer logs a separate `WARN` line, beginning "OpenBao server certificate verification is OFF", whenever `BAO_SKIP_VERIFY` or `VAULT_SKIP_VERIFY` has turned verification off. It also names `openbao.tls_ca_file` as overridden when that is set.
- Every other variable in effect gets a `WARN` line saying what it changes and which `openbao` setting, if any, it overrides. A variable that is set but superseded by openvox-ca's own configuration gets an `INFO` line. Variables are logged by name only, because `BAO_TOKEN` and the certificate variables can hold secrets.
- If the environment stops the client being built at all, the startup error lists the variables that were set, and withholds any URL the environment supplied.
- `docs/openbao-transit.md` now has a table of every variable the client reads, what it controls and whether the environment or openvox-ca wins. `BAO_SKIP_VERIFY` always wins: no openvox-ca setting turns verification back on. `docs/configuration.md` points to the table.
- Specs fail if an upgrade of the OpenBao client library starts reading a variable the table does not list.
## What to do
Move to a build that includes `6740ab96dc28` (2026-10-13 or later), and check the signer's startup log for "OpenBao server certificate verification is OFF" and "OpenBao client setting taken from the environment". A clean environment logs neither. Remove any `BAO_*` or `VAULT_*` variable you did not intend from the CA's unit file, container image or pod spec.
On any build, `env | grep -E '^(BAO|VAULT)_'` in the signer's environment shows what the client will read.
Betroffene Pakete im beobachteten Stack
Gogithub.com/voxpupuli/openvox-ca0.0.0-20261013091901-6740ab96dc28GHSA-v745-5q22-55f6
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